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in Hartley. Thus, the ability of a party to "hide" the name of a witness,
which was ended in theory by Allen, is also being terminated by the
lower courts in practice.
ARTICLE 32 -ACCELERATED

JUDGMENT

CPLR 3212: Dobkin "real party in interest doctrine" not extended to
motion for summary judgment.
In Kopperman v. Zar,8 9 plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in one co-defendant's vehicle when it struck the rear of the other
co-defendant's vehicle. Both defendants were insured by the same liability carrier, and there was no question but that the accident was
caused by the negligence of either or both defendants. Since she clearly
was not contributorily negligent, the plaintiff, relying upon Dobkin
v. Chapman,00 sought summary judgment against the insurer on the
grounds that it was the "real party in interest."
The "real party in interest issue" arose in Dobkin when the defendants moved to set aside service because of an alleged denial of due
process. Defendants could not be located for service after they had
become involved in an automobile accident in New York, and the
Court upheld service whereby the summons and complaint were mailed
to defendant's last known address in New York and a copy thereof was
delivered to defendant's insurance carrier- the real party in interest.
The ratio decidendi of Dobkin is that the requirements of due process
have been met if defendant has been given reasonable notice. And the
question of reasonableness depends upon a balancing of interests after
consideration is given to all the attendant circumstances.0 1 Accordingly,
it noted that in view of "the plaintiff's need, the public interest, the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts under all the cricumstances to
inform the defendant, and the availability of other safeguards for the
defendant's interest," 92 service in Dobkin was reasonable, whereas the
same manner of service in another case might fail to meet the requirements of due process.
It is readily apparent from the tone of the Kopperman opinion
that the "real party in interest" theory may well be limited and restricted to those situations in which a plaintiff would otherwise be unable
to serve the proper defendant. The court suggests three problems which
89 59 Misc. 2d 102, 298 N.Y.S.2d 150 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1969).
90 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968). Dobkin is a consolidation
of three cases. See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302,
310 (1968). See also 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 308, supp. commentary 167 (1968).
91 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 808, supp. commentary 167 (1968).
92 21 N.Y.2d at 503, 236 N.E.2d at 458, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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militate against the extension sought by the plaintiff; all arise because
the respective liabilities and alleged negligence of the individual
wrongdoer have not been proven. First, the policy limits of the codefendants may differ, and the payment of any judgment may be impossible if one or both of the policy limits have been exceeded. Secondly,
the issue of the defendant's liability inter se, even though the carrier
will ultimately pay the judgment, affects, if nothing else, the co-defendants' respective future liability insurance rates and the availability
of future insurance coverage. Finally, the co-defendants should be
granted the opportunity to protect themselves against the imposition
of a judgment even if the insurance carrier pays the same. Since the
latter two considerations are neither moot nor hypothetical, there seems
to be no good reason to fail to adjudicate respective liabilities in favor
of mere acceleration, although the Kopperman court suggests that such
a procedure for "innocent plaintiffs" should be adopted by the legislature.
Kopperman thus appears to stand for the proposition that the
judiciary is not about to give carte blanche application to any "real
party in interest" theory, and will limit it to the truly worthy plaintiff,
contemplated in Dobkin, who is otherwise remediless.
CPLR 3213: Court suggests that error in computation of motion date
can be remedied through exercise of its discretion.
One of the problems confronting an attorney desiring to utilize
the special procedure afforded by CPLR 3213 arises because he is
compelled to set the hearing date in advance of actual knowledge of
the time that the summons and motion for summary judgment in lieu
of a complaint are to be served on the defendant.9 3 This requirement
represents a potential conflict within CPLR 3213 in that the section
has a built-in time sequence which dictates that there be a specified
limit of time between the service of the summons and notice of motion
and the motion return date.
CPLR 320(a), incorporated by reference into CPLR 3213, prescribes the minimum time after service before which the motion can
be heard, and, under this rule, if service is made by personal delivery
of the summons to the defendant in New York, he has twenty days
within which he must answer; if the summons is served by any other
93
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FoPNss, Form 29, at 57 (Bender Pamphlet ed.

1968). The notice of motion must specifically set forth the time that the motion is to be
heard.

